Hyperliquid

Hyperliquid L1 · off-chain matching

Facts

Chain: Hyperliquid L1
Order Book Type: off-chain matching
Withdrawal control: Native bridge; withdrawals require 2/3 validator staking-power signatures plus a dispute window. Agent/API keys cannot withdraw; a separate user-wallet signature is required.
Operator surface: Hyperliquid L1 (HyperBFT consensus) validator set. No standalone insurance fund; the HLP / liquidator vault backstops liquidations, with ADL as the final solvency backstop.
Upgrade authority: Bridge + core contracts are controlled by role-based EOAs with NO timelock (L2BEAT flags this critical and calls it "instantly upgradable"). Foundation cold-wallet EOAs can invalidate withdrawals; there is no permissionless forced-exit. Node software is closed-source; ~24-28 validators, Foundation ~50% of stake.
Multisig: See venue docs
Last SolGov check: n/a

Incident history

2025-03-26
JELLY squeeze: validators voted to force-settle a manipulated position via oracle override (~$12-13.5M swing to HLP).
source
2025-11-13
POPCAT manipulation forced ~$4.9M bad debt onto HLP; deposits/withdrawals and the Arbitrum bridge were halted.
source
2025-07-29
~37-min API/order-submission outage from a traffic spike; consensus kept producing blocks; no funds lost.
source

Chain, orderbook type, withdrawal control and operator surface are sourced from Hyperliquid's own documentation. If a field is wrong or out of date, the source link is the authoritative reference.

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Facts

Chain: Hyperliquid L1
Order Book Type: off-chain matching
Withdrawal control: Native bridge; withdrawals require 2/3 validator staking-power signatures plus a dispute window. Agent/API keys cannot withdraw; a separate user-wallet signature is required.
Operator surface: Hyperliquid L1 (HyperBFT consensus) validator set. No standalone insurance fund; the HLP / liquidator vault backstops liquidations, with ADL as the final solvency backstop.
Upgrade authority: Bridge + core contracts are controlled by role-based EOAs with NO timelock (L2BEAT flags this critical and calls it "instantly upgradable"). Foundation cold-wallet EOAs can invalidate withdrawals; there is no permissionless forced-exit. Node software is closed-source; ~24-28 validators, Foundation ~50% of stake.
Multisig: See venue docs
Last SolGov check: n/a

Incident history

2025-03-26
JELLY squeeze: validators voted to force-settle a manipulated position via oracle override (~$12-13.5M swing to HLP).
source
2025-11-13
POPCAT manipulation forced ~$4.9M bad debt onto HLP; deposits/withdrawals and the Arbitrum bridge were halted.
source
2025-07-29
~37-min API/order-submission outage from a traffic spike; consensus kept producing blocks; no funds lost.
source